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Answering the contributions of the four commentators
Introduction
Thank you once more Trudy, Katharina, Ralph and Derek, for providing these comments. I
gladly grant that I have learned a lot from all of them. They have offered me new views on
parts of my book, The Concept of Argument (TCA), in front of which it was highly instructive
to reformulate - and also in some cases to complete – my own ideas. Certainly this is the
best that can happen to an author.

I. Answer to Derek Allen’s Comment
Derek Allen’s comment is particularly welcome to me because on the one hand it gives a
precise deployment of important parts of my view, touching some of the core ideas
(justification, knowledge, truth) and on the other it offers me the opportunity to say
something about the relationships between the epistemic approaches in argumentation
theory and my own view.
(1) Epistemic approach and dialectic-pragmatist view
In my view validity (as the attempted result of a justification) and acceptance are separated.
Validity depends on the quality of the arguments whereas acceptance is independent of that
quality. This makes my concept an “epistemic” one – or, better, because of this salient
theoretical feature my view is compatible with the epistemic approach.
The proper epistemic approach, however, struggles with unclarities concerning as well the
believability of premises as with the quality of the conclusion of a good but not compelling
argument. I will shortly sketch these and then allude how a pragmatic foundation can help
clarifying things.
How can we be justified to believe the “premises” of an argument if they are not clearly
true? I don’t know if the epistemic approaches provide a unified answer. Goldman seems to
claim, that one can be “personally justified” to believe P, insofar as one has an argument for
P, how good or bad it might ever be. He even claims that interpersonal justification
ultimately relies on personal justification. I think this view should be adjusted with
elaborating the idea of a “personal justification” with the demand that P has to be proven, at
least for the believer, as an orientation. If not, this “being justified to believe” would refer to
all kinds of mere opinions – which certainly are not suitable to function as premises in an
“interpersonal justification”.
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Quite instructive I find the consideration of Freeman (shown with the example that if a ten
ton truck approaches me I “conclude” to take evading action without at first scrutinizing any
premises) that coming to believe basic statements “is frequently something immediate”.1 I
think this is a correct observation, but again we should consider, that we have learned to do
so in the course of our practical life, where the immediately believed statement can be taken
as reliable. In short: If we inquire more carefully we can see, that the epistemic state of
justified belief relies ultimately on a pragmatic fundament.
Second question: What is the quality of a conclusion which is justifiably believed (as in
Goldman’s epistemic account of IP-justification)? If it is knowledge then the premises must
already have been known and the inference must be formally valid. An argument with
premises that are only believed and an inference that is not formally valid, cannot justify a
conclusion to be knowledge. What is the quality that they are able to justify? Biro&Siegel
demand that good arguments “increase the knowability … of their conclusions”2. But what is
the “knowability” of a proposition that is not known? I think in my concept of “thetic
validity” there is a good characterization of that quality. It is that it provides insight and trust
to the suitability as a new orientation together with the confirmation that there are no
objections open against it. The upshot of these considerations is, that the epistemic
approach urges for some pragmatic foundation.
Supplement:
There is certainly much more to be said about the comparison between the epistemic
approaches and my pragmatic views. One thing which can sharply point to the said urgency
of a pragmatic foundation is the following: As far as I can see, Goldman’s epistemic account
of what a “good argument” is, would allow us to qualify the two most instructive fallacies,
namely “Ad baculum” and “Begging the question” as good arguments3. If this is true it shows
clearly that an epistemic justification needs to be grounded in pragmatic thinking.
(2) The link between justification and truth

1

Cf. Freeman, J., Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification, in Informal Logic Vol 17 (1995),
270-278; there: 275, see also p. 277: “Any adequate account of premise acceptability that hopes to be
applicable in the evaluation of real world arguments needs to develop an account of acceptability which allows
certain cases of immediate acceptance to be acceptable and yet is normative.”
2
Biro, J. & Siegel, H., Argument and Context, forthcoming in Cogency (2016), MS p. 2
3
“Ad baculum” would appear as a prudential argument. Premises: If you don’t hand over the money you will
not stay alive. You want to stay alive. Conclusion: Therefore you should hand over the money. If this is put into
a deontological system it is a valid practical argument with a Modus Tollens structure. Under the respective
conditions the addressee is certainly “justified” in believing the premises. “Begging the question” is simpler. I
am certainly justified to believe in p as a conclusion if I am justified to believe in p as a premise, as there is a
valid inference from p to p. But this is not what we would consider a “good argument”.
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One of the great difficulties in the debates about the epistemic concept of knowledge as it
has been shaped by the Gettier problem is the presupposition of the concept of truth.
Concerning truth, philosophers find themselves confronted with several different theories,
the dominating ones are spinning off into the metaphysical realm by somehow demanding a
correspondence of the linguistic content with reality itself. My studies with the logician and
philosopher Paul Lorenzen have convinced me that the whole theoretical architecture
should be revised. We can start with basic orientations that are ultimately anchored in
felicitous practices. Theories are the symbolic representation of orientations. In the wake of
appearing orientation gaps they are improved in research, whose cognitive layer is
argumentation. Here the concept of justification enters. “Knowledge” can be ascribed to
mature states of theories which are theoretically transparent and whose orientation value is
so profoundly proven that they shape our reality.
After these preparations it is possible to justify simple statements like “there is a cat” with
first: our seeing the cat, second: the knowledge about the semantics of the words ‘there’,
‘is’, ‘a’ and ‘cat’, and third: the knowledge about visual perception. The sentence can be
“true” insofar as it is a description of a state of affairs in our normal orientation that is
theoretically supported by parts of our codex of knowledge. Obviously this is a truth concept
which goes without any metaphysical presuppositions.

(3) Allen’s meticulous reading has brought about an ambiguity in my use of the term
‘justification’, which I was not aware of. Usually it is meant as a term indicating an operation,
whose goal it is, to show the validity of a thesis. Very rarely it also stands for having achieved
that goal and is then a “success term” (like repair, open, close etc.).

II. Answer to the Comment of Katharina Stevens
This comment delivers a profound presentation of our reconstructing the subjectivity in
argument with the help of frame theory. It correctly assumes, that this is the zone where the
view of TCA can be connected to “rhetorical argumentation theory” and now proposes a way
to perform this connection in developing the “Universal Audience” (UA) as a rhetorical
criterion of validity. I have found this very interesting, but I don’t think that it works. Besides
this she alludes a comparison between audience and opponent, which has also highly
attracted my attention.
(1) Audience and Opponent
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The “audience” in contemporary rhetoric has only little in common with the “auditorium” of
traditional rhetoric (and also of Perelman’s “New” rhetoric). A need to consider the addressee’s participation and to take their possible objections into account, has been felt. Thus,
meanwhile the relationship speaker–audience is very often a verbally disguised form of a
dialogical setting. Only the fact that the audience is certainly meant not only to respond but
finally also to accept the speaker’s theses, makes a striking difference to the role which, at
least in my thinking, the opponent should adopt. I concede that in TCA the opponent role is
only roughly characterized, but one thing is clear: Its function is merely the scrutinizing and
controlling of the justification that the proponent forwards.
This opponent is not demanded to accept a thesis, even if he/ she finds no defect in the
justification. Why? The motivational side of “validity”, the insight or the trust in that the
thesis will work as a new orientation, can be missing. And the freedom to follow one’s own
insight is a high value. If the opponent has no objections or got all his objections integrated
or refuted, but lacks a comprehensive insight then he should be free to refrain from assent.
This does not damage the “validity” of the thesis. Because its criterion, the “absence of open
objections”, is fulfilled (Insight and trust are subjective inner states, they can be illusionary,
therefore they should not count as criteria of validity.)
Thus, it is evident that the expectations of the arguer towards an “audience” are more farreaching than those towards an “opponent” (in my sense). Who is right here?

I think that the rhetorical conception of the (“interactive”) audience merges issues into the
argumentative process which do not intrinsically belong to it. Let us investigate this. Why
should the speaker not only want to learn about the audience’s objections in order to
improve his/her justification but also attempt assent? I can see three possibilities:
First: He himself is not sure enough of his thesis and would get an additional confirmation
(additional to the state of the arguments) from the fact that the audience agrees. This,
however, makes only good sense, if the audience is more competent, i.e. if it is in an
authority position – otherwise the assent would be purely contingent.
Second: The speaker believes that the audience would fare better if they go with the thesis.
Here it is the speaker who claims an authority position. This makes very good sense in
teaching-learning settings, like with parents or teachers. It should be clear, however, that
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this kind of audience’s assent has no additional confirmation function. The validity of the
thesis has to safe by the state of arguments.
Third: The assent is needed because it is a common issue. This is a frequent case (families,
clubs, politics). If, however, the missing assent does not depend on open objections, then, I
think, one may chose whatever means to achieve it (rewards, flatteries, warning of bad
consequences, throwing dyes - or any rhetorical tool, certainly also reframings or frame
manipulations).
Upshot: In all these cases we find exterior circumstances that deliver reasons for attempting
assent; they are not internal to the process of argument.

(2) Universal Audience as a criterion of validity
Perelman’s UA was an idea about how to distinguish between potentially manipulative
“persuasion” and universally valid “conviction”. The distinctive element should be the
speaker’s way of addressing an audience. If at least he was not playing on the idiosyncrasies
of her particular audience then this addressing could expect to meet some more universal
acceptance. The UA then was a kind of idealization in that direction. Given the issues that
Perelman was dealing with (remember that the whole realm of exactness, science, formal
knowledge was thrown out of what he called ‘argumentation’) this is certainly a rough
thumb rule to distinguish between better and worse arguing. Meanwhile rhetoric has
widened the scope and claims relevance for all realms. Consequently the conception of the
UA had to be developed.
Christopher Tindale has modified the UA in a way that it is now a dialogical enterprise
governed by rationality criteria4. I have argued in TCA that this construction needs additions
which would carry it near my own construction of the “Open Forum”5. But even then there
would still be a considerable difference between the task of this modified UA which is
universal acceptance and the task in my dialectical-pragmatist view which is validity based
on arguments.
Now Stevens comes up with an ethical accentuation of the UA. Here the arguer is allowed or
even demanded to manipulate the frame structures of the issue according to the “cognitive
environment” of his or her particular audience. But at the same time he is obliged to
“respect” that audience by only arguing for valid theses. Stevens insinuates that this ethically
4
5

Tindale (2004), Chap 6: Developing the universal audience
See Wohlrapp (2014), p. xlviii f
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modified version of the UA would convene with the theoretical design in TCA and would thus
connect it to Rhetoric. I am not convinced.
If Stevens’ ethically loaded UA is really meant as a criterion of validity it has the blemish of
presupposing validity. Why: If I have to deal with objections that come in a deviant frame I
might try my frame-manipulating rhetorical tools. But as long as I have not appropriately
overcome the heterogeneity of the arguments and then have successfully integrated or
refuted those objections, I would not be able to provide the demanded “respect”, i.e. to
defend only “valid” theses.
Maybe we can avoid this vicious circularity in demanding that the rhetorical arguer should
restrict his/ her persuasive endeavor to theses that he/she honestly believes to be valid. But
this would not save the case. Just the great and daunting demagogues like Hitler’s
propaganda minister Josef Goebbels honestly believe in their views. Thus, when Goebbels
“invited” his audience in Berlin’s “Sportpalast” to accept his claims by using those rhetorical
tools that were appropriate to enter the minds of his particular audience and, thus,
managed to bestow an enthusiastic insight on them about the prospect of a “total war”,
then, I think, this had to be deemed as valid, since it was meant as an appeal to the UA – if I
understand Stevens’ proposal correctly.

(3) Argumentation and Rhetoric
As to the general relationship between rhetorical argument and my pragmatic
understanding of argument I would like to make the following statements: Every argument
has not only an epistemological content but also a rhetorical form. This form can be
fostering or hindering not only acceptance but also insight. Yet using rhetorical means in
order to foster insight (or acceptance) does not take the audience as a dialogue partner, but
as a field for promulgating a view. As I have already mentioned, this is all right in teachinglearning situations, where it is clear that, what is taught, it is not a piece of new (thetic)
theory, but knowledge. Teaching may imply arguing but such an arguing attempts insight on
the side of the student into established knowledge. This has to be distinguished from
genuine argumentative settings where the aim is to test whether or not a certain thesis is
suitable as new orientation.
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Rhetoric has its proper role in teaching, in arguing this role remains dubious. Why:
Arguments count or do not count due to their content. The content of an argument,
however, typically abstracts from the rhetorical form.
The fact that a thesis T is acceptable for or accepted by an audience (whatever audience:
even the most competent and most reasonable one) is never a justification for T. We can
always ask a person why he/ she has accepted T. An answer like: because the whole
audience has accepted T remains insufficient.
Supplement:
There is one correction to be made in Stevens report about my theories concerning frame
management. I do not hold that frames can only be changed via rhetorical influence.
Therefore I have cared for some strategies to handle frame differences through
argumentation. With some short examples I have explained what I mean, and then with
extensive examples out of the trial against the king during the French Revolution I have
shown how they can work 6.
Literature:
Tindale, Ch. (2004), Rhetorical Argumentation. Principles of Theory and Practice, Thousand
Oaks: Sage
Wohlrapp, H. (2014), The Concept of Argument. A Philosophical Foundation, Dordrecht:
Springer
III. Answer to Trudy Govier’s comment
I want to thank her for the praising words she starts with and, at the same time, express a
certain surprise about her hesitant treatment of my theoretical inventions - particularly
those of Chap. 6, that she is mainly speaking about. Still, I gladly concede that even these
comments, though surprising and maybe a bit understated, has made me think through once
again the theoretical design of the Pro-Con settings, and that I am grateful for this. The
comment is concerned about two topics and my answer will tackle them subsequently.
(1) Product Approach – PPC model
My criticism of this approach is not, that it promotes a certain model of argument, and is
insofar limited - as any theoretical model is necessarily limited: Being only an abstract
representation it has to leave out details which could be important. My criticism is rather
that this model restricts our basic view, our pre-understanding of argument, to a certain
structure: Premise group-inferences-conclusion. I am sure, this structure is a legacy of formal
logic. I think, people enjoy in it a specific kind of plausibility or even certainty, a feeling that
is due to their familiarity with the logical inference form. But I admit, this is not of striking
6

See Wohlrapp (2014), pp. 204-209, 214-229, 261-265.
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importance. It is only my personal explanation for the ongoing domination of the “product
approach”.
More important is , that I do not plainly dismiss the PPC structure. I rather believe that it can
only appropriately be understood in a larger setting, which has to be recognized in order to
avoid misunderstandings. Still, this is not a matter of being concerned about macro- or
micro-structure of argument (of playing the fox or the hedgehog). I have been striving for
years to show that defining argument in terms of this structural thought pattern is misled
and misleading7; and one of the most striking deceptions which it has produced, is the
Wellman-Govier “Conductive Argument” scheme.

(2) Theorization of Pro- and Con Argumentation (“Conductive Argument”)
I first want to express my satisfaction about Govier’s clear statement, that the whole talk of
“weight” and “outweighing” of arguments is metaphorical and that we should no longer
search for any objectively quantitative meaning of those expressions. (I am satisfied here,
because this was not always so – which is why I uttered my first criticism to the “conductive”
model in the early 90ies.)
But now, in what she is answering to the much more elaborated criticism in Chap. 6 of my
book (and in my contribution to the Conductive Argument Anthology8), I see her regrettably
moving right to the opposite position. As there is no objective meaning to be found in the
quantitative metaphors, she seemingly now regards the weight or strength aspect of
arguments as a merely subjective affair.
If it is so, this is a poor solution and I daresay it is a rather bad one. Moreover I really regret
that Govier keeps ignoring the whole apparatus which I have worked out in order to analyse
more appropriately the occurrence of a Pro- and Con-Argumentation. I have distinguished
four dimensions (see Chap. 6.2, 6.3, 6.4), in particular a process dimension and a structure
dimension (“discussion” and “inferential structure”). Usually the arguments do not fall out of
the blue sky, but they are found and shaped and developed in a process in which some
might change, others fade out and new ones appear. Thus, the acceptance of a conclusion is
not an inferring operation, but is usually the result of backwards and forwards reasoning, in
7

See e.g. already Wohlrapp (1995), Resolving the riddle of the non-deductive argument schemes, in: ISSA III
Proceedings, Amsterdam: SicSat, Vol. 2, 55-62
8
See Wohlrapp (2011), Conductive Argument: A misleading model for the analysis of Pro and ContraArgumentation, in: Blair, A./ Johnson, R. (eds.) Conductive Argument. An overlooked type of defeasible
Reasoning, London: College Publications, 210-223
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which the linear transition from premises to a conclusion is replaced by a “retroflexive”
structure. In it we check various pro/con combinations against various conclusions – so that
the finally accepted conclusion is not simply supported by premises but equally the selection
of a specific premise combination is supported by the selection of a certain conclusion.
If Govier’s illustration about a woman weighing family health against personal career is
deployed simply as a listing of pros and cons and then deciding somehow, the analysis would
be too narrow. It would consist in getting aware of the woman’s preference system and its
concretization in the wake of the actual problem. (Formalists would certainly analyse this
with rational decision theory.)
But what if there is a counter-position, what if the woman has to deal with the childrens’
father? Certainly then a more complex theory is needed to analyse the events.
This leads us to a second aspect which is even more important. Govier’s comment seems to
pose a decision about the pros and cons in cases like that mother completely inside the
limits of the subjectivity of the arguing person(s). Sure, the mother will integrate some
knowledge (about e.g. effects of rural environment to health, effects of reduced chances for
a personal career etc.) into her reasoning; and that is an “objective” element. But the final
decision – viz. her “reasons” for it – seems to be fabricated out of her immediate
preferences.
This is a narrow, instrumentalist view of argument. I have proposed an enlarged and
deepened view. A “reason” is – in particular when it comes to practical decisions – not an
immediate preference but a “reflected” one. The difference is that reflection has taken
place. In it our subjective orientations – at least those parts which are affected by the issue –
have been put up for consideration: consideration about other viewpoints, other
importances, common needs. So there is need, on the one hand for a more complex theory
and on the other for an awareness of the transsubjective demand in dealing with one’s
subjectivity.

IV. Answer to Ralph Johnson’s comment
For Ralph Johnson, being one of the founding fathers of Informal logic, the challenge that
poses my dialectical pragmatist view seems to be immense. I am glad that even though he
has made up his mind and here offers several important points - concerning the nature of
dialogue and of objections - whose thinking through have considerably improved my
understanding.
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(1) The two sides of validity
Before I start I have to forward a little correction concerning Johnson’s Section III. What
there is dubbed the “basic normative principle (BNP)” is not my basic normative principle9.
The respective passage on p. 280 is the characterization of what I have called “The criterial
side of validity”10. The concept of validity, as it is elaborated in the book, has then also a
subjective side, consisting of “insight” and “trust”. Insight is tackled under the headline “The
motivational side of validity” (p. 272-278).
The whole concept of validity is defined as such:
Argumentative validity is the quality of a conclusion, acknowledged in the forum, of conveying and/or
consolidating, as the result of an objection-free justification, insight into a domain in question and
being thus suitable as a new orientation for action in this domain11.

Let me add that I can understand this error as a result of a view where we mainly care for
criteria under which the achievement of persuasion via argument can be deemed rational.
Here issues like “insight” and “trust” would not appear as relevant. If however the aim of
argument is determined as a strive for a new orientation which would best close my
orientation gap, then it is a substantive issue to expect insight and trust from an argument.

(2) The dialogical setting and the Non-Interactive Audience
If argumentation is posed into a dialogical setting (Proponent/ Opponent) and its outcome is
made dependent of the dialogue partner’s participation, then the fact that a lot of
arguments are displayed to a Non-Interactive Audience (NIA) is a problem.
Until now this problem was mainly attributed to the Amsterdam Approach. As Govier has
shown, a pragma-dialectic arguer can never be sure, whether or not his argument is a good
one and has succeded12. It is a trivial truth: If the audience does not interact, then neither
can tell it the arguer that it disagrees with his/her view, nor whether he/she has achieved
the solution of the disagreement. But this problem is due to Amsterdam’s aim of
argumentation being the overcoming of a standpoint difference. Govier mentions that for
Informal Logic that problem exists as well, albeit in a lighter version. It is instructive that in
9

If I were asked, if there is a basic normative principle in The Concept of Argument and what it is, I would point
to the “Principle of Transsubjectivity”, see Wohlrapp (2014), Chap. 10.
10
See the heading of the respective section in Wohlrapp (2014), p. 278
11
Wohlrapp (2014), p. 270
12
See Govier (1999)
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Informal logic it is equally caused by the determination of the aim of argument: If I argue in
order to rationally persuade my audience than a NIA has somehow to be asked if it is
persuaded or not. The problem is minor in Informal Logic, because the “being persuaded”
can be reduced to premise acceptability – and very often the arguer may have a good guess
about what premises his/her particular audience might accept.
As to our Hamburgian view that problem does not exist at all. Why: the target quality of
“validity” is defined in a way, that the final assent of an audience is not necessary. If I argue I
attempt the best available new orientation. Therefore I want to justify it and therefore I care
for an opponent to scrutinize my justification. The function of the opponent is to forward me
objections (if there are any on the background of his system), which I have a proper interest
to parry, i.e. to refute or integrate into my justification. I do not have a “duty” or “obligation”
but I have an active interest in parrying these objections, because I have set out for the best
available new orientation. So in our view the dialogue partner’s delivery of objections is a
necessary assistance of my own argumentative endeavor.
If the opponent has either no objections or all his objections are met, so that there is no
“open” objection left, then this opponent is by no means obliged to accept my thesis. If he/
she lacks the insight or has not won the respective trust that my thesis would work as an
orientation, then he might shrug the shoulders and go his/her way.
Please note that this result is not a rare fiction but a rather common result: the thesis comes
out valid – relative to the state of the regarded arguments – and the interlocutor does not
agree. His non-agreeing, however, would only be relevant for me, if he forwarded a further
objection.
Now, if I present an argument to a NIA this means that I do not expect to get any distinctive
support of my audience. And this means that my arguing in front of the NIA is not directed
towards the investigation whether or not my thesis is valid, but is directed towards the
promulgation of my thesis. The quality of the promulgation (argumentative, rhetorical,
marketable) of a certain thesis can of course be important – but it considers purposes
outside the intrinsic purpose of arguing, if it is seen as the investigation of the validity of the
thesis.

(3) Constraints and limitations in answering to objections
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The question was here (section 4: About “closing” the objection) what material the
proponent can use in order to parry, diffuse, integrate or refuse an objection. The general
answer is: All kinds of “epistemic theory”, i.e. theory whose orientation value is already
established. If the proponent invokes a piece of theory which is not accepted (i.e.the
respective step of the justification is not followed) by the opponent or is confronted with
contradicting epistemic theory, then this proponent has to deliver more epistemic theory to
parry the objection. In case there is not enough epistemic theory available, the proponent
can also use thetic theory. This has, of course, to be justified in a sub-dialogue before the
proponent can proceed further with the (main) justification.
No further constraints have to be respected, i.e. the proponent can use everything, can also
repeat any “premises” (his own and the opponent’s) which have already been used. The only
thing that cannot be used in the justification is the thesis itself – this would be a petitio
principii (it would beg the question).

(4) Influence and fertility as criteria for good arguments?
I recommend to not considering these qualities as criteria for good arguing. Maybe one
could define “fertility” in a way that it includes already the goodness of an argument. But the
sheer fact that an argument effectuates traces in other minds and in the subsequent history
is independent of its reasonable quality. Very bad arguments have had a huge and
devastating influence (e.g. arguments for the conquest of the New World or for the
conquest of Europe by the alleged superior German race, or, lately, of Iraq by the coalition of
the willing).

(5) Ad: Observation 3: What, exactly, is an ‘open objection’?
Johnson is right in demanding that there should be differentiating distinctions in what can
count as an “objection”. I only think that on the general level, on which I am speaking, it is
enough to have one expression (objection) for instantiations of the operation “criticizing”.
How many kinds or types of instantiations we want to have, depends then on the context
and has to be justified with regard to the specific case.
As to the question what an “open objection” is, the answer is simply that it is one which has
not been “closed” sufficiently. The determination about what is sufficient here lies
ultimately in the responsibility of the proponent – because he/she wants to work with the
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thesis. The sole constraint that is important here, cannot be put into the form of an exterior
rule or norm (or commandment). It is the principle of transsubjectivity which is the decisive
instance.

Literature:
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